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THE EVOLUTION OF THE ENFORCEMENT 
PROVISIONS OF THE FEDERAL WATER 
POLLUTION CONTROL ACT: A STUDY 
OF THE DIFFICULTY IN DEVELOPING 
EFFECTIVE LEGISLATION 
Frank ]. Barry* 
MAN has not voluntarily chosen a polluted environment. He has, however, voluntarily elected to undertake the activities which 
have produced a polluted environment. These activities have bio-
logical and often cultural motivation. Reproduction of the species 
and the virtues of hard work, thrift, and ingenuity are favorably 
regarded in our literature, music, and art; and despite the fact that 
the possession of wealth cannot be the cause or effect of moral 
superiority, men tend to reserve a special courtesy and honor for 
wealthy persons. These conscious and· unconscious forces have in-
duced men to multiply in numbers and affiuence. As the numbers of 
men have increased, the amount produced and consumed has also 
increased. Likewise, as afHuence has increased and become more 
widespread, each individual has produced and consumed more. The 
effects of this affiuence are that society produces only by means that 
are most convenient and consumes only that which is most satisfy-
ing. What is less convenient or satisfying it discards. This propensity 
is exhibited in almost everything man does: in the morsels he 
selects to eat, in the clothing he changes daily, and in unused articles 
he accumulates. It is also exhibited in what man throws away-into 
the river, into the air, and onto the trash pile. Spurred by these 
biological and cultural appetites, man's intelligence has brought him 
to a condition in which the production of children and goods, which 
was formerly necessary to his survival, now jeopardizes his survival 
by creating an environment saturated with pollution. It is clear, 
then, that the rate at which pollution is growing must be arrested 
and that pollution itself must be substantially reduced. Pollution 
control, however, is difficult enough just from the technological 
standpoint, for pollution cannot be entirely abated without a com-
plete recycling of materials. The task is made even more difficult 
by the fact that success depends on the development of habits and 
practices which are seemingly contrary to demonstrated biological 
and cultural instincts. 
• Visiting Professor of Law, University of Oregon. A.B. 1934, University of Cal-
ifornia at Los Angeles; LL.B. 1941, Loyola University at Los Angeles.-Ed. 
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The Federal Water Pollution Control Act,1 which was originally 
enacted in 19482 and which has been amended five times from 1956 
to 1970,3 has been the primary federal response to the problem of 
water pollution. The development of that Act in the past twenty-two 
years has been a story of delayed and inadequate response to the 
increasing problems of water pollution. The development of the 
Act's enforcement provisions is particularly representative of those 
problems. It is the purpose of this Article to examine that develop-
ment, to point out the shortcomings in the Act, and to analyze the 
effort that has been made to improve the Act's enforcement pro-
visions. 
I. EVOLUTION OF THE Acr 
A. The Water Pollution Control Act of 1948 
Prior to 1970, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act under-
went five stages of evolution. The first of these was the Water Pollu-
tion Control Act of 1948,4 which supplied the general framework for 
later legislation. That Act stated that the states have the primary 
responsibilities and rights in water pollution control; and it pro-
vided for the preparation of comprehensive plans to abate water 
pollution, for the encouragement of interstate cooperation in this 
endeavor, for federal financial assistance to states and municipalities, 
for the Federal Water Pollution Control Advisory Board, and for 
federal authority to seek judicial orders for the abatement of water 
pollution. 
That Act made subject to such abatement the pollution of "inter-
state waters,"5 which were defined as "all rivers, lakes, and other 
waters that flow across, or form a part of, State boundaries."6 The 
I. 33 U.S.C. §§ 466-66k (1964), as amended, 33 U.S.C. §§ 466-66n (Supp. IV, 1965-
19.68), as amended, Act of April 3, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-224, 84 Stat. 91. 
2. Act of June 30, 1948, ch. 758, 62 Stat. 1155. 
3. Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1956, ch. 518, 70 Stat. 498; Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-88, 75 Stat. 204; 
Water Quality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903; Clean Water Restoration 
Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-753, 80 Stat. 1246; Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, 
Pub. L. No. 91-224, 84 Stat. 91. 
4. Act of June 30, 1948, ch. 758, 62 Stat. 1155 [hereinafter 1948 Act]. There had 
been many earlier federal statutes dealing with specific water pollution problems. 
See, e.g., River and Harbor Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1964) (originally enacted as 
Act of Feb. 28, 1899, ch. 425, § 13, 30 Stat. 1152); Act of Aug. 21, 1916, ch. 360, § 3, 39 
Stat. 518, codified in 43 U.S.C. § 362 (1964); Oil Pollution Act of 1924, ch. 316, 43 
Stat. 604 (repealed by Act of April 3, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-224, § 108, 84 Stat. 91, 
see text accompanying notes 132-33 infra). 
5. 1948 Act § 2(d)(l). 
6. 1948 Act § l0(e). 
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limitation of enforcement jurisdiction to interstate waters was not a 
serious restriction, for pollution which reached interstate waters 
only through tributaries was also subject to abatement.7 
A more serious restriction, however, was the requirement that 
in order for the pollution to be subject to abatement, that pollution 
must have caused or contributed to a danger to the "health or welfare 
of persons" in a state other than the state in which the discharges 
originated.8 That limitation rendered untouchable by the Act pol-
lution in many interstate waters. For example, the coastal waters of 
California form a part of a state boundary and thus constitute inter-
state waters under the Act's definition. Pollution originating in the 
San Joaquin River, an intrastate stream, might pollute those coastal 
waters; but it is highly improbable that such pollution could extend 
northward to Oregon's coastal waters and thereby endanger the 
health or welfare of persons in Oregon. Thus, because such a con-
dition would probably not endanger the health and welfare of per-
sons outside California, the 1948 Act would not be able to reach it. 
There are many other examples in which the pollution of interstate 
waters would endanger only local residents. 
The 1948 Act provided that if the Surgeon General did find that 
interstate waters were polluted by discharges in one state and that 
the health and welfare of persons in another state were endangered, 
he could give a formal notification to the alleged polluters, recom-
mend measures for abatement, and set a reasonable time for the 
polluter to comply with his recommendations. In doing so, he was 
required to give notice of his action to the water pollution control 
agency of the state in which the pollution originated. If abatement 
measures had not been initiated within the time which he had 
prescribed, the Surgeon General could give a second notice to the 
alleged polluter and the agency. He could include in the second 
notice to the state agency a recommendation that it proceed by 
court action to abate the pollution.9 If, within a reasonable time 
after the second notice, no abatement action had been undertaken 
and no suit filed, the Federal Security Administrator10 could appoint 
a board and call for a hearing before that board. The Act provided 
that a majority of the hearing board had to consist of persons who 
were not officers or employees of the Federal Security Agency, that 
7. 1948 Act § 2(d)(l). 
8. 1948 Act § 2(d)(l). 
9. 1948 Act § 2(d)(2). 
IO. The Public Health Service, headed by the Surgeon General, was, in 1948, a 
subdivision of the Federal Security Agency. Reorganization Plan No. I of 1939, § 205, 
5ll Stat. 1425. 
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at least one member of the board could be designated by each state 
in which the pollution originated, and that one member was to be a 
representative of the Department of Commerce.11 The Act further 
directed that the board, after having heard evidence, was to recom-
mend to the Administrator "reasonable and equitable" measures to 
be taken for the abatement of the pollution.12 The recommendations 
of the board became the effective recommendations under the Act 
and superseded any prior inconsistent recommendations of the 
Surgeon General and the Federal Security Adm.inistrator.13 
If the alleged polluter had not complied with the board's recom-
mendations within a reasonable time, the Administrator could "with 
the consent of the water pollution agency ( or any officer or agency 
authorized to give such consent) of the State or States in which the 
matter causing or contributing to the pollution [was] discharged, 
request the Attorney General to bring a suit on behalf of the United 
States to secure abatement of the pollution."14 The Act directed 
that when the Attorney General brought the suit, the court in 
which the abatement proceeding was instituted was to consider 
evidence taken by, and the recommendations of, the board, and to 
hear any other evidence it deemed necessary.15 In rendering its judg-
ment, the court was required by the Act to give due consideration 
to the practicability and to the physical and economic feasibility of 
securing abatement of any pollution proved; and in that consider-
ation, the judge could be governed by his own view of the public 
interest and the equities of the case.16 
As the foregoing presentation indicates, the enforcement pro-
visions of the 1948 Act left much to be desired. Under that Act, the 
Government could bring a court -action only if a polluter was dis-
charging pollutants which were endangering persons in another 
state; and a polluter could avoid a court action entirely if it could 
persuade a majority of the hearing board to recommend abatement 
measures which appeared "reasonable and equitable" to the polluter 
as well as to the hearing board. The board was so constituted that 
it was possible for the accused polluter to prevail with his suggestions 
at this point in the proceedings. A polluter could also avoid court 
action if it could persuade the officials of its own state to refuse to 
11. 1948 Act § 2(d)(3). 
12. 1948 Act § 2(d)(3). 
13. 1948 Act § 2(d)(3). 
14. 1948 Act § 2(d)(4). 
15. 1948 Act § 2(d)(7). 
16. 1948 Act § 2(d)(7). This standard has endured to the present day. 33 U.S.C. 
§ 466g(h) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
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consent to the bringing of an abatement action by the Attorney 
General. Prospects of success in obtaining the denial of consent were 
enhanced by the fact that those who had to be endangered by the 
pollution were not constituents of such officials. Thus, unless the 
pollution also substantially endangered persons in the state in which 
the discharges originated, there was little incentive for the local 
officials to consent to an abatement action. Finally, even if those 
obstacles were overcome and the Attorney General did bring an 
abatement action, and even if the pollution and its danger were 
proved, the polluter might avoid an adverse ruling by showing that 
abatement would be impracticable or physically or economically un-
feasible. Thus, even as a beginning, federal enforcement provisions 
were not impressive as deterrents to pollution; and, not surprisingly, 
no lawsuits were filed under the authority of the 1948 Act.17 
B. The 1956 Amendments 
In 1955 the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, to 
whom the administration of the 1948 Act had been transferred,18 
urged the Congress to amend the Water Pollution Control Act. In 
the Secretary's discussion of the Act's enforcement provisions, she 
pointed out that after notice of a violation had been given to a 
polluter and after abatement action had been recommended, a 
second notice, as required by the 1948 Act, served no purpose but 
delay. She also suggested that the provisions which required the con-
sent of officials of the state in which the polluting discharges origi-
nated permitted such officials to veto any action to abate the pollu-
tion. The Secretary requested that both of these requirements be 
eliminated.19 
Congress complied with the Secretary's requests by passing the 
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1956 (1956 Act).20 In 
doing so, however, it modified the procedure in a way which served 
to introduce more delay into the administrative process. To the 
notification and hearing board procedures of the 1948 Act, the 1956 
Act added an intermediate procedure. The new procedure provided 
17. Hearings on S. 4 Before the Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the 
Senate Comm. on Public Works, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 29-32 (1965). 
18. Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1953, § 5, 67 Stat. 632. The administration of 
the Act has subsequently been transferred to the Secretary of the Interior. Reorga-
nization Plan No. 2 of 1966, § I, 80 Stat. 1608. 
19. Letter from Mrs. Oveta Culp Hobby to Sam Rayburn, Speaker of the House 
of Representatives, Jan. 31, 1955, in STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON PUBLIC Wo=, 84TH 
CONG., 1ST SESS., COMPARATIVE PRINT OF CHANGES PROPOSED To BE MADE IN THE 'WATER 
POLLUTION CoNTROL ACT 11 (Comm. Print No. 2, 1955). 
20. Act of July 9, 1956, ch. 518, 70 Stat. 498 [hereinafter 1956 Act]. 
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that if the Surgeon General found actionable pollution to exist, or if 
he was petitioned by a state, he was required to call a conference of 
all state and interstate water pollution control agencies of all the 
states concerned.21 At the conclusion of that conference he was to 
prepare and fonvard to the agencies a summary of the discussfons, 
including those related to the occurrence of actionable pollution, the 
adequacy of abatement measures, and the nature of any delays in 
effecting abatement.22 This conference procedure took even more 
time than had the second-notice procedure which had been objec-
tionable under the 1948 Act. In addition, the new Act included a 
built-in delay of at least six months, for it provided that if effective 
abatement measures were not being carried out, the Surgeon Gen-
eral, upon conclusion of the conference, should recommend to the 
appropriate state agencies that they undertake remedial action them-
selves within a reasonable time; the time allowed for these state 
efforts was six months.23 If the state-controlled remedial action had 
not been taken within the time prescribed, the Secretary of Health, 
Education, and Welfare could then call a hearing before a board.24 
The composition of the hearing board and its proceedings were 
substantially the same as prescribed by the 1948 Act, except that the 
board was now required to make findings respecting pollution and 
any abatement action being taken.25 The Secretary was directed to 
transmit the findings and his recommendations to the alleged pol-
luters, giving them not less than six months to comply.26 
Whereas the 1948 Act had given polluters "a reasonable oppor-
tunity to comply" with an abatement order, the 1956 Act, by allow-
ing six months after the receipt of the recommendations of the board 
in addition to the six months it already allowed after the conference 
and before the calling of a public hearing, gave to the polluter an 
assurance of immunity for at least a year after the Government had 
first interested itself in the case. Indeed, when the delay encountered 
in procedural matters is taken into account, it is clear that the 
built-in delay extended well beyond one year. After a request had 
been made to the Surgeon General to call a conference, additional 
time would have been required for him to be informed of its justifi-
cation and for him to make necessary arrangements. The statute pre-
21. 1956 Act § S(c)(l), as amended, 33 U.S.C. § 466g(d)(l) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
22. 1956 Act § 8(c)(l), as amended, 33 U.S.C. § 466g(d)(4) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
23. 1956 Act § 8(d), as amended, 33 U.S.C. § 466g(e) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
24. 1956 Act § 8(e), as amended, 33 U.S.C. § 466g(f)(l) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
25. 1956 Act § 8(e), as amended, 33 U.S.C. § 466g(f)(l) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
26. 1956 Act § 8(e), as amended, 33 U.S.C. § 466g(f)(l) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
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scribed that three-weeks' notice be given to the conferees.27 The 
conference itself, the deliberations of the conferees, the preparation 
of a summary of the conference proceedings, and the preparation of 
the Surgeon General's recommendations would all have taken even 
more time. After the recommendations had been made and the first 
six-month period had expired, further time would have been con-
sumed in preparing for the public-hearing procedure. First, the 
Secretary had to obtain nominations from those who were required 
by statute to be represented, and he had to appoint the hearing 
board.28 Then, three-weeks notice had to be given prior to the hear-
ing.20 Furthermore, the hearing itself could have been lengthy, and 
additional time would have been required for the board to prepare 
its findings and recommendations. Not until the recommendations 
had been transmitted to the alleged polluters did the second six-
month period begin to run. 
If, within the time prescribed, the polluter had not commenced 
action to abate pollution, the Secretary could then request the At-
torney General to file an abatement action.30 But before he could 
make such a request, the Secretary had to have either a written re-
quest from the water control agency of one of the states in which 
the health and welfare of persons was endangered or the ·written con-
sent of the corresponding agency in the state or states in which the 
pollution originated.31 Delay in obtaining the necessary requests or 
consents was to be expected, because copies of the board's findings 
had to be sent to the interested state agencies, 32 and those agencies 
would have needed time to study the recommendations. From these 
indications, then, it is clear that substantial delays were to be ex-
pected at every stage of the proceedings; and since the basic proce-
dure has not been changed since 1956, such delays still remain a 
problem in most cases.33 
Another problem with the abatement provisions of the 1956 Act 
was that, like those of the 1948 Act, they applied only to interstate 
waters. Moreover, the definition of "interstate waters" was signifi-
cantly narrowed. Under the 1948 Act, pollution of any boundary 
waters was subject to abatement.34 But in the 1956 Act the term 
Z/. 1956 Act § 8(c)(2), as amended, 33 U.S.C. § 466g(d)(3) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
28. 1956 Act § S(e), as amended, 33 U.S.C. § 466g(f)(l) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
29. 1956 Act § S(e), as amended, 33 U.S.C. § 466g(f)(l) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
30. 1956 Act § 8(£), as amended, 33 U.S.C. § 466g(g) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
3 I. 1956 Act § 8(£). 
32. 1956 Act § S(e), as amended, 33 U.S.C. § 466g(f)(l) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
33. See note 70 infra and accompanying text. 
34. See text accompanying note 6 supra. 
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"interstate waters" was defined as "all rivers, lakes, and other waters 
that flow across, or form a part of, boundaries between two or more 
States,"35 thus excluding from the abatement provisions of the Act 
all coastal and many other major waterways. The Administration 
had not requested such a change nor had the Senate Committee. The 
bill which had been approved by the Senate Committee had passed 
the Senate in June of 1955;36 but by the time the House Public 
Works Committee considered it, another bill,37 which was said to 
be a revision of the Senate bill38 and which contained the. new 
definition of "interstate waters," had been introduced.39 Ultimately, 
that revised bill became the 1956 amendments. When the modified 
definition was re-examined in 1961 by the House Committee on 
Public Works, that committee stated: 
The present law •.. excludes from enforcement jurisdiction the 
greater part of the Great Lakes and their tributaries, the coastal 
waters of the Nation, many important coastal streams, intrastate 
water bodies such as the Detroit River, those of Florida, and all 
rivers, streams, lakes, and coastal waters of Alaska, Hawaii, and the 
Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico. International boundary streams such 
as the St. Lawrence, Niagara, lower Colorado, and Rio Grande 
Rivers are untouchable under the act. The same situation exists as 
to international streams flowing across the northern and southern 
borders of the United States into our international neighbors. Ex-
amples are the Red River of the North in Minnesota, Lake Cham-
plain in New York, Souris and Riviere Rivers in North Dakota, and 
the Flathead and Kootenai Rivers in Montana. In addition, the Mis-
souri River from the Kansas State line to just above St. Louis is an 
untouchable area under existing law. The greater part of the Hud-
son River is excluded, as are important reaches of the Tennessee, 
35. 1956 Act § ll(e). 
36. S. 890, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955), 101 CONG. REc. 8627 (1955). 
37. H.R. 9540, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955). 
38. Hearings on S. 890 and H.R. 9540 Before the Subcomm. on Rivers and Har-
bors of the House Comm. on Public Works, 84th Cong., 1st&: 2d Sess., No. 84-17, at 
103 (1955-1956). 
39. The House Public Works Committee had commenced hearings on S. 809 in 
July 1955, but it adjourned the hearings after one day and did not recommence them 
until eight months later, at which time H.R. 9540 had been introduced. The origin 
of the new language contained in H.R. 9540 may have been the result of an objection 
voiced in the· 1955 House hearings by California's water pollution control agency. 
H.R. REP. No. 1446, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 45 (1955). This objection attacked the earlier 
definition of interstate waters on the ground that they included coastal waters. Cal-
ifornia's substitute definition excluded coastal waters (id. at 49), as did the definition 
accepted by the Congress. The House committee chairman did not list the change 
as a "major" change (id. at 103); rather, the House report merely stated: "For pur-
poses of this act the committee believes this is an improved and clearer definition." 
Id. at 4. The Conference Report simply noted that the House version had been ac-
cepted in conference. H.R·. REP. No. 2479, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1956). 
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Columbia, Colorado, and Merrimack Rivers. Of the estimated 26,000 
water bodies in the United States, there are only an estimated 4,000 
of an interstate nature.4o 
Another significant aspect of the legislative history of the 1956 
Act is one which relates to water quality standards. For the first time 
it was formally proposed that Congress adopt a more traditional en-
forcement procedure by establishing water quality standards so that 
pollution would be defined in advance of any abatement action.il 
Under the 1948 Act-and indeed under all amendments prior to 
1965-the authorities were required to prove in each case not only 
that a body of water had been polluted by an alleged polluter's dis-
charges, but also that the pollution actually, in that very case, 
endangered someone's health and welfare. It was not unlawful to dis-
charge wastes into a river if no one used the water. Polluters could 
thus argue that if the quality of a river had been rendered so no-
toriously bad that no one dared use it, except to carry more filth, 
they were innocent of any violation of federal law.42 The 1956 pro-
posal for water quality standards would have made subject to the 
sanction of an abatement proceeding any discharge which reduced 
the quality of water below standards previously established. That 
proposal would have provided for investigations, consultations, and 
studies with municipalities, industries, and federal and state water 
pollution control agencies, and for the adoption and publication of 
standards by the Surgeon General. Under the proposal, the Surgeon 
General would have been directed to base standards on present and 
future uses of water for water supply, fish and wildlife, recreation, 
agriculture, industry, and other legitimate uses. Standards could 
have been established by the Surgeon General only when, in his judg-
ment, the states had failed to adopt adequate standards. The com-
mittees of both the Senate and the House rejected this proposal in 
1956, leaving the courts to determine in each case whether the al-
leged pollution was in fact harmful to the health and welfare of 
individuals. The 1956 Act also left unchanged the procedure in 
court and the power of the court to substitute its independent judg-
ment for that of the Surgeon General and that of the Secretary.43 
The principal fonvard step taken in the 1956 Act was to remove 
40. H.R. REP. No. 306, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1961). 
41. The proposal was made by the administration. STAFF OF HouSE CoMM. ON 
PUBLIC WORKS, 84TH CoNG., lsr SESS., COMPARATIVE CHANGES PROPOSED To BE MADE IN 
THE WATER POLLUTION CoNTROL ACT 6 (Comm. Print No. 2, 1955); it was incorporated 
in § 7 of S. 890, § 7 of H.R. 3426, and § 8 of S. 5897, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955). 
42. See, e.g., 1956 Act § 8. 
43. 1956 Act § 8(g), codified in 33 U.S.C. § 466g(h) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
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from authorities of the state in which pollution originated the power 
to veto court action.44 That veto power had been inherently incon-
sistent with the idea of any federal abatement power, for if states 
had had the political power to challenge economically important 
polluters, they would probably have used their police power to enact 
and enforce their own antipollution laws so that federal legislation 
would have been unnecessary. On the other hand, if states did not 
dare institute abatement actions themselves, neither would those 
states have been likely to provide the consent necessary for the 
United States to institute such actions. This factor may have been 
partially responsible for the fact that no actions had been brought 
under the 1948 Act. It is clear, however, that the state veto power 
was not the only impediment to federal court action, for only one 
court action was brought under the 1956 Act, and that action was 
not filed until 1960.45 Moreover, as late as August 1967, that action 
was the only court action ever filed under the Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act. 46 
In spite of many shortcomings, the 1956 Act did constitute 
a small step toward federal control of pollution. Congress had 
labored long and hard on the Act; and although the result was not 
all that could reasonably have been desired, at least the problems 
of pollution were being vigorously aired. Fortunately, as those prob-
lems became more pressing, the number of concerned legislators 
steadily increased. 
C. The 1961 Amendments 
Some further advances in federal control of water pollution 1\Tere 
accomplished in the 1961 amendments to the Act (1961 Act).47 The 
scope of the Act was broadened to include almost all of the waters 
of the nation: 
The pollution of interstate or navigable waters in or adjacent to 
any State or States (whether the matter causing or contributing to 
such pollution is discharged directly into such waters or reaches such 
waters after discharge into a tributary of such waters), which en-
44. 1956 Act § 8(£). See text accompanying note 31 supra. 
45. Hearings on S. 4 Before the Special Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of 
the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1965). 
46. Hearings on Activities of the Federal Water Pollution Control Administration 
-Water Quality Standards Before the Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the 
Senate Comm. on Public Works, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 674 (1967). 
47. Federal Water Pollution Control J\meni;lmen~ of 1961, Pub. L, No. 87-88, 75 
Stat. 204 [hereinafter 19§1 Act], 
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dangers the health or welfare of any persons, shall be subject to 
abatement as provided in this Act.48 
The definition of "interstate waters" was amended to encompass "all 
rivers, lakes, and other waters that flow across or form a part of 
State boundaries, including coastal waters."49 This definition sub-
stantially restored the 1948 formulation, and it removes any doubt 
that coastal waters are included. Under this revised definition, navi-
gable waters, expressly covered by the Act for the first time, can 
include intrastate waters which are not tributary to interstate waters. 
The Senate committee expressly recognized that intrastate waters 
were included in the new language, pointing out that "it would be 
helpful to States in coping with water pollution problems, if the 
Federal Government were permitted, upon request of the Governor, 
to enter into intrastate cases .... " 150 The term "navigable waters" 
is not defined by the Act; but it has had a fairly definite meaning 
since the case of The Daniel Ball,151 decided by the United States 
Supreme Court in 1871. In that case, the Court stated: 
Those rivers must be regarded as public navigable rivers in law 
which are navigable in fact. And they are navigable in fact when 
they are used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary con-
dition, as highways for commerce, over which trade and travel are or 
may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on 
water.152 
In addition, under the 1961 Act, federal abatement authority was 
expanded to cover pollution caused or contributed to by discharges 
within the same state in which the "health or welfare of persons" is 
endangered.153 Under the 1956 Act the Secretary had been authorized 
to call a conference-whether upon request of state authorities or 
on his own motion-only when the pollution in question en-
48. 1961 Act § Sa, codified in 33 U.S.C. § 466g(a) (1964). 
49. 1961 Act § 9e, codified in 33 U.S.C. § 466j(e) (1964). 
50. S. REP. No. 353, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1961). The House committee also con-
sidered some intrastate waters to be covered by the Act. H.R. REP. No. 306, 87th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1961). 
51. 77 U.S. (IO Wall.) 557 (1871). 
52. 77 U.S. (IO Wall.) at 563. This definition is consistent with the term "naviga-
ble waters of the United States" as used in the 1966 amendment of the Oil Pollution 
Act of 1924. That term is there defined as "all portions of the sea within the terri-
torial jurisdiction of the United States, and all inland waters navigable in fact." Oil 
Pollution Act of 1924, ch. 316, § 2(4), 43 Stat. 604, as amended, 33 U.S.C. § 432(4) 
(Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
53. 1961 Act § Sa, codified in 33 U.S.C. § 466g{a) (1964). 
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dangered persons in another state.54 The 1961 Act expands that au-
thority somewhat by permitting the Secretary to call a conference 
when pollution of interstate or navigable waters is endangering the 
"health or welfare of any persons," including those living in the 
state in which the pollution originated. Such a conference can be 
called, however, only upon request of the governor of the state in 
which the pollution has originated.ri5 That requirement has the ef-
fect of severely limiting the application of the Act in such intrastate 
situations, for the fact that the state has not proceeded against the 
polluter under its police power probably indicates a lack of convic-
tion to proceed at all, since police power measures can be more swift 
and effective than those available under federal law. 
In one other respect the 1961 Act opened the way for some in-
crease in the availability of federal enforcement. Under the 1956 
Act, if a municipality suffering from pollution desired federal as-
sistance in combating that pollution, the community faced the prob-
lem of overcoming the traditional reluctance of its state government 
to challenge important industrial polluters, since only the state gov-
ernor or state water pollution control authorities could make the 
request necessary to initiate federal action.56 Under the 1961 amend-
ments, however, a municipality is permitted to make such a request 
directly, although the municipality is still required to obtain the 
concurrence of the governor and of the state water pollution control 
agency.57 
D. The 1965 Water Quality Act 
The years following the passage of the 1961 amendments saw 
renewed interest in a proposal for federal water quality standards 
applicable to interstate waters-a proposal that had been suggested 
as early as 1956. 58 After the resolution of considerable differences be-
tween the House and Senate versions of such a proposal, 59 a com-
promise bill was passed by Congress and was signed into law by the 
President on October 2, 1965. That bill became the Water Quality 
Act of 1965, 60 which amended the Federal Water Pollution Control 
Act. 
54. 1956 Act § 8(c)(l); the limitation originated with the 1948 Act. See text accom• 
panying note 8 supra. 
55. 1961 Act § 8(c)(l), as amended, 33 U.S.C. 466g(d)(l) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
56. 1956 Act § 8(c)(l). 
57. 1961 Act § 8(c)(l), as amended, 33 U.S.C. § 466g(d)(l) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
58. See text accompanying notes 41-43 supra. 
59. See 111 CONG. REc. 1545 (1965); H.R. REP. No. 215, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 
(1965). 
60. Act of Oct. 2, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903 [hereinafter 1965 Act], 
amending 33 U.S.C. § 466 (1964). 
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Section I0(c) of the Water Pollution Control Act, added by the 
1965 amenclments,61 provides for the establishment of water quality 
standards applicable to interstate waters. Under the procedure pro-
vided for adopting such standards, designated state officers file a 
letter of intent to adopt acceptable criteria, together with a plan for 
the implementation and enforcement of those criteria.62 I£ after 
public hearings the state adopts such criteria, and if the Secretary 
finds the criteria to be consistent with the requirements of the Act, 
then such criteria and plan become the applicable water quality stan-
dards. 63 On the other hand, if the state does not file the letter of 
intent to adopt the criteria and plan, the Secretary, after a confer-
ence and consultations with interested parties, can prepare regula-
tions setting forth his own standards for water quality.64 If, within 
six months after publication of such regulations, the state fails to 
adopt acceptable standards or to request a public hearing, the Secre-
tary can then promulgate his own standards. 65 The standards, 
whether initiated by the state or the Secretary, are required to be 
such as to protect the public health or welfare, enhance the quality 
of water and serve the purposes of [the] Act. In establishing such 
standards the Secretary, the Hearing Board, or the appropriate State 
authority shall take into consideration their use and value for pub-
lic water supplies, propagation of fish and wildlife, recreational 
purposes, and agricultural, industrial, and other legitimate uses.66 
I£ the Secretary promulgates his own standards, the governor of an 
affected state can, within thirty days after promulgation, ask for re-
vision, in which case the Secretary is required to call a hearing. The 
composition of the hearing board which is called to consider such 
revisions is substantially the same as that of the board which is con-
vened for the public hearing that follows the conference procedure. 67 
I£ the hearing board revises the Secretary's standards, he is required 
to promulgate regulations incorporating the revisions. 68 
61. 1965 Act § 5(a), codified in 33 U.S.C. § 466g(c) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
62. 1965 Act § 5(a) (adding § l0(c)(l) to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
[hereinafter FWPCA]), codified in 33 U.S.C. § 466g(c)(l) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
63. 1965 Act § 5(a) (adding § lO(c)(l) to the FWPCA), codified in 33 U.S.C. 
§ 466g(c)(l) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
64. 1965 Act § 5(a) (adding § 10(c)(2) to the FWPCA), codified in 33 U.S.C. 
§ 466g(c)(2) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
65. 1965 Act § 5(a) (adding § 10(c)(2) to the FWPCA), codified in 33 U.S.C. 
§ 466g(c)(2) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
66. 1965 Act § 5(a) (adding § 10(c)(3) to the FWPCA), codified in 33 U.S.C. 
§ 466g(c)(3) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
67. 1965 Act § 5(a) (adding § I0(c)(4) to the FWPCA), codified in 33 U.S.C. 
§ 466g(c)(4) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). See text accompanying notes 10-11, 24-25 supra. 
68. 1965 Act § 5(a) (adding § 10(c)(4) to the FWPCA), codified in 33 U.S.C. 
§ 466g(c)(4) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
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In addition to providing for water quality standards, the 1965 
Act makes subject to abatement the discharge of matter which 
reduces below the established standards the quality of interstate 
waters.69 That provision applies only to "interstate" waters and not 
to other "navigable" waters.70 When the Secretary finds that pollu-
tion has reduced the quality of interstate waters below standards, he 
may request the Attorney General to bring the action to abate.71 
If the discharges and the persons affected are in the same state, the 
consent of the governor of that state is required before the action can 
be commenced.72 Furthermore, no action may be commenced until 
180 days after the Secretary has given notice of the alleged violation 
of the standards to "violators and other interested parties."73 Thus, 
in the rather limited case of a violation of standards on an interstate, 
not merely "navigable," stream, the lengthy conference and hearing 
board procedures are replaced by a single six-month notice period. 
The 1965 amendments further expand the scope of enforcement 
under the basic Act by authorizing the Secretary to call a conference 
when "he finds that substantial economic injury results from the in-
ability to market shellfish or shellfish products in interstate com-
merce because of pollution referred to in subsection (a) and action 
of Federal, State, or local authorities."74 
E. The Clean Water Restoration Act of 1966 
The Clean Water Restoration Act of 196675 made several addi-
tions to the enforcement provisions of the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act. The 1966 legislation authorizes the Secretary to call a 
conference at the request of the Secretary of State when it appears 
69. 1965 Act § 5(a) (adding § IO(c)(5) to the FWPCA), codified in 33 U.S.C. 
§ 466g(c)(5) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
70. Section 10(c)(5) of the FWPCA, 33 U.S.C. § 466g(c)(5) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968), 
which allows for the 180-day notice for the bringing of an abatement action, applies 
only when the discharge that reduces the quality of the waters below the established 
water quality standards is into interstate waters. This limitation follows from the fact 
that water quality standards can be established under the Act only for interstate 
waters. See text accompanying note 61 supra. For a discussion of this limitation, see 
Dunkelberger, The Federal Government's Role in Regulating Water Pollution Under 
the Federal Water Quality Act of 1965, 3 NATURAL REsOURCF.S LAw 3, 12-14 (1970). 
71. 1965 Act § 5(a) (adding § IO(c)(5) to the FWPCA), codified in 33 U.S.C. 
466g(c)(5) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
72. 33 U.S.C. § 466g(g)(2) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
73. 1965 Act § 5(a) (adding § 10(c)(5) to the FWPCA), codified in 33 U.S.C. 466(c)(5) 
(Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
74. 1965 Act § 5(b) [amending FWPCA § IO(d)(l)], as amended, 33 U.S.C. 
466g(d)(l) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
75. Act of Nov. 3, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-753, 80 Stat. 1246 [hereinafter 1966 Act], 
amending 33 U.S.C. § 466 (Supp. I, 1965). 
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that pollution originating in the United States is endangering the 
health or welfare of persons in a foreign country.76 Foreign countries 
affected by the pollution are to be represented, with all the rights of 
a state water pollution control agency, both at the conference and 
before any subsequent hearing board which might be called in con-
nection with the conference procedure.77 The Act further provides 
that only those foreign countries which grant reciprocal rights to 
the United States can take advantage of these procedures.78 
The 1966 Act took another important step toward more effective 
enforcement by authorizing the Secretary to require an alleged pol-
luter to file with him a report, based on existing data, which fur-
nishes information concerning the "character, kind, and quantity" 
of the discharges and which shows what "use of facilities or other 
means" is being made to reduce such discharges.79 The Secretary 
may call for such a report either during a conference, provided that 
a majority of conferees so request,80 or at the hearing board stage.81 
Thus, whereas the law prior to 1966 was silent with respect to how 
the Secretary was to obtain specific evidence of pollution, the 1966 
legislation furnishes the Secretary with a means to gather data for 
use in framing specific recommendations and for possible use in 
subsequent proceedings. Failure to comply with a request for a re-
port subjects a polluter to a fine of 100 dollars per day.82 However, 
trade secrets and secret processes need not be disclosed, and informa-
tion submitted by the polluter is to be treated as confidential by the 
Secretary.83 
II. PROBLEMS WITH THE Acr 
Although the Federal Water Pollution Control Act was amended 
four times between 1948 and 1966, each amendment contained only 
76. 1966 Act § 206 [amending FWPCA § 10(d)(2)], codified in 33 U.S.C. § 466g(d)(2) 
(Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
77. 1966 Act § 206 [amending FWPCA § 10(d)(2)], codified in 33 U.S.C. § 466g(d)(2) 
(Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
78. 1966 Act § 206 [amending FWPCA § 10(d)(2)], codified in 33 U.S.C. § 466g(d)(2) 
(Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
79. 1966 Act § 208(b) (adding § 10(£)(2) to the FWPCA), codified in 33 U.S.C. 
§ 466g(f)(2) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
80. 1966 Act § 208(a) (adding § IO(k)(l) to the FWPCA), codified in 33 U.S.C. 
§ 466g(k)(l) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
81. 1966 Act § 208(b) (adding § 10(£)(2) to the FWPCA), codified in 33 U.S.C. 
§ 466g(f)(2) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
82. 1966 Act §§ 208(a), 208(b) (adding §§lO(k.)(2), 10(£)(3) to the FWPCA), codified 
in 33 U.S.C. §§ 466g(k.)(2), 466g(f)(3) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
83, 1966 Act §§ 208(a), 208(b) (adding §§ IO(k)(l), 10(£)(2) to the FWPCA), codified 
in 33 U.S.C, §§ 466g(k)(l), 466g(f)(2) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
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partial solutions to the manifest problems in preceding versions of 
the Act, and in some cases the amendments created new problems. 
Moreover, some of the basic problems with the enforcement pro-
visions of the 1948 Act were never remedied by amendment. In re-
sponse to the enforcement problems which existed under the Act 
after 1966, Congress earlier this year passed the Water Quality Im-
provement Act of 1970.84 As will be discussed later,85 the 1970 
amendments, like prior amendments to the Act, have partially solved 
some problems and largely ignored others. In order to understand 
why reform was needed and what improvement, if any, the 1970 
amendments have made in the Act, it is necessary to analyze the 
enforcement problems which existed under the Act as it stood in 
1969 and which in many cases remain today. 
One basic problem with the Act was that it did not create a 
realistic division of authority between federal and state law. The 
1970 amendments have made a small attempt at solving this prob-
lem,86 but for the most part the problem remains. The policy of the 
Act is to encourage state efforts in abating pollution.87 Only when 
the alleged polluter is a federal installation does the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act pre-empt state law.88 Although it cannot be 
doubted that state and local efforts are indispensable in attempting 
to curb water pollution, the Act's policy against pre-emption seems 
to discourage any organized mobilization of national effort. By allow-
ing state and federal laws to overlap in all phases of pollution control 
except that concerning federal installations, the Act fosters duplica-
tion of effort and a waste of valuable resources. Pollution is con-
sidered .by many to be the paramount problem which this country 
will face in the next decade;89 it is thus imperative that efforts to 
fight pollution be well organized. Surely some problems are purely 
local in character and accordingly may be dealt with by the states 
or municipalities either alone or in conjunction with the federal 
government.90 Other problems, however, are of such character that 
84. Act of April 3, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-224, 84 Stat. 91, amending 33 U.S.C. 
§ 466 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
85. See text accompanying notes 136-62 infra. 
86. See text accompanying notes 161-62 infra. 
87. 33 U.S.C. § 466g(b) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
88. 33 U.S.C. § 466h (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
89. See State of the Union Message by President Nixon, Jan. 12, 1970, in U.S. CODE 
CONG. &: An. NEWs 7, 11 (1970); House Comm. on Govt. Operations, News Release, 
House Conservation Subcommittee To Hold Hearings on Action Program for Envi-
ronmental Decade of 1970's Gan, 16, 1970). 
90. See text accompanying notes 161-62 infra. 
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they can best be handled by the federal government alone.91 In order 
to be effective, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act must desig-
nate which aspects of water pollution are of paramount federal inter-
est, so that state and local authorities can concentrate on the aspects 
of pollution that are more susceptible to state and local regulatory 
authority. Failure to draw distinct battle lines in the fight against 
pollution constitutes a major weakness in the Act. 
Another major problem with the Act, and one which the 1970 
amendments only begin to solve, is that the Act is not related in any 
comprehensive scheme to other federal provisions dealing with pollu-
tion control. As mentioned previously, only one abatement action 
has been brought under the Act in twenty-two years.92 This fact is 
not particularly surprising in view of the acute problems of delay 
built into the Act. 93 If the federal government does find a severe case 
of ongoing pollution on a navigable but intrastate stream,94 it makes 
little sense to require the Government to resort to the Act's lengthy 
conference and hearing board procedures, which take more than a 
year to complete before an abatement action can be filed. Even if 
the discharge is into an interstate stream for which water quality 
standards have been adopted, the delay is six months.95 Moreover, if 
the origin and effects of pollution are confined to one state, the Sec-
retary may encounter problems in getting the Governor of that 
state to consent to the bringing of an action.96 The 1970 amendments 
do substantially reduce these problems in the case of water pollution 
caused by oil discharges,97 and they contain a mechanism whereby 
other pollutants may eventually be reached as well.98 But, at the 
present time, severe types of pollution other than that caused by oil 
discharge are not readily subject to attack under the enforcement 
procedures provided by the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. 
Thus, if immediate measures against such pollutants are needed, the 
Attorney General must turn to other federal laws such as the 1899 
Rivers and Harbors Act.99 Although important actions have been 
91. See text accompanying note 161 infra. 
92. See note 46 supra and accompanying text. 
93. See text accompanying notes 21-33, 70-73 supra. 
94. See note 70 supra and accompanying text. 
95. Id. 
96. See text accompanying note 55 supra. 
97. See text accompanying notes 137-46 infra, 
98. See text accompanying notes 147-50 infra. 
99. 33 u.s.c. § 407 (1964). 
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brought under that Act,100 it is essentially a criminal statute,101 and 
it applies only to "refuse matter ... other than that flowing from 
streets and sewers and passing therefrom in a liquid state."102 In view 
of these considerations, Congress might well consider incorporating 
the 1899 Act into the Federal Water Pollution Control Act and 
making the latter statute the basis of a comprehensive scheme pro-
viding for a full panoply of remedies for all types of pollution.103 
Another problem with the enforcement provisions of the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act-and one on which the 1970 amend-
ments are completely silent-involves the formulation of the judicial 
standard for entering the abatement order. Under that formulation, 
a court may refuse to order abatement of even the most heinous pol-
lution if it finds that such abatement would not be physically or 
economically feasible or practical.104 At best this standard is impre-
cise; at worst it may provide polluters with a substantial loophole 
through which to avoid an abatement order. Considerable trial time 
may be consumed in presenting evidence relating to the feasibility 
of abatement-time which could be spent for abatement itself. In 
many cases, if the Attorney General is to succeed in securing the 
relief, he must prove not only the existence of illegal pollution, but 
also the existence of a reasonable method of abatement.105 Such a 
variable standard based on the apprehended equities of particular 
situations tends to afford a choice to corporations whose manufac-
turing processes produce considerable pollution. They can either 
attempt to make their polluting discharges reasonably abatable or 
they can create such a great vested interest in pollution that abate-
ment becomes unfeasible. A judicial standard which allows polluters 
to make the latter choice does not seem to be in the public interest. 
100. E.g., United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482 (1960); Sanitary Dist. 
v. United States, 266 U.S. 405 (1925). 
IOI. On the availability of injunctive relief, compare United States v. Republic 
Steel Corp., 286 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1961), with United States v. Bigan, 274 F.2d 729 (2d 
Cir. 1960). 
102. 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1964); see United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224 
(1966). There has recently been renewed interest in the 1899 Act. See 116 CONG, REc. 
H 2640 (daily ed. April 2, 1970) (remarks of Representative Reuss). 
103. The 1970 amendments seem to take a step in this direction by repealing the 
Oil Pollution Act of 1924 and dealing with the problem of oil pollution through civil 
and criminal penalties, provision for immediate abatement, and the assessment of re-
moval costs under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. See text accompanying 
notes 137-46 infra. 
104. See text accompanying note 16 supra. The 1948 standard was re-enacted in 
the 1956 Act, § S(g), and is now found in 33 U.S.C. § 466g(h) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
105. 33 U.S.C. § 466g(f)(2) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968) will be of help to the Attorney 
General only if the alleged polluter has "existing data" of a reasonable method of 
abatement. See text accompanying notes 79-81 supra. 
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A further problem with the enforcement provisions of the Act 
lies in the fact that they give the polluter-even one who could 
easily abate-no incentive to do so in the absence of an abatement 
order. The 1970 amendments reach this problem only in the very 
limited area of pollution by oil discharges.106 For the most part, 
however, the Act does not forbid conduct which causes pollution; 
instead it merely threatens a polluter with the possibility that, fol-
lowing the lengthy proceedings required under the Act, he may be 
subjected to an order to abate. Compliance with the court order may 
be more costly than continued pollution, and consequently the pol-
luter may strive to delay for as long as possible the entering of the 
abatement order.107 Moreover, he risks little by continuing to pol-
lute, since in general the Act provides no penalty for previous acts 
of pollution. It seems clear that the judicial remedy of abatement, 
although crucial to any pollution control scheme, is not in and of 
itself a sufficient deterrent to potential polluters. By focusing on the 
single remedy of abatement and by refraining from imposing civil 
or criminal penalties in any area but that of oil discharges, the Act 
fails to make most acts of pollution sufficiently costly to the polluter 
to affect his initial decision whether to engage in conduct which 
causes pollution. Thus, imposing economic incentives at the de-
cision-making stage seems imperative not only with respect to oil 
discharges, but with respect to all types of water pollutants. 
What little deterrent the Act's enforcement provisions might 
have is further reduced by the Act's failure to provide an adequate 
mechanism for gathering data on pollution and polluters. This prob-
lem remains in 1970, since the amendments do not deal with it. The 
only provision made by the Act for gathering evidence of pollution 
is that which permits the Secretary to require "reports" from alleged 
polluters.108 Those reports may be required both at the conference 
and the hearing board stage, 109 but the effectiveness of the require-
ment is substantially reduced by the provision that reports be based 
on existing data.110 The Act places no affirmative burden on industry 
to conduct studies on pollution and its prevention, and consequently 
only those polluters who make an independent effort to study the 
106. See text accompanying note 140 infra. 
107. The proceedings under the Act entail considerable delay, as outlined above. 
St!e text accompanying notes 21-33, 70-73, 93-95 supra. Furthermore, the polluter may 
resort to tactics such as that suggested in the text accompanying notes 104-05 supra. 
108. See text accompanying notes 79-83 supra. 
109. See text accompanying notes 80-81 supra. 
110. 33 U.S.C. § 466g(f)(2) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
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pollutant effect of their industrial wastes are adversely affected by 
the report requirement. Thus, 'the verbal formulation of the report 
requirement seems to put a premium on inaction, at least for the 
polluter who fears that the Secretary may proceed against him under 
the Act. Moreover, the report requirement is useful as a data-gath-
ering device only at a relatively advanced stage of the proceedings, 
since before the Secretary can initiate proceedings or demand a re-
port, he must have some evidence on which to base an allegation of 
a violation of water standards.111 Yet the Act is silent as to how 
evidence of pollution is to be gathered in the first instance. The 
lack of a permanent method112 to measure pollution and to identify 
polluters necessarily impedes the effective implementation of water 
quality standards under the Act. 
A related problem with the Act, and one on which the 1970 
amendments are similarly silent, concerns formulation of the water 
quality standard~ themselves. Certainly it is essential that there be 
well-defined standards for water quality; but it seems equally essen-
tial that there be quality standards for industrial and municipal 
effluents.113 Furthermore, standards should be developed to prevent 
the degradation of relatively clean streams to the minimum accept-
able water quality level. Without effluent and degradation standards, 
pollution would be permissible until its cumulative effect reduced 
the quality of a given body of water below the standards provided 
for in the Act. An industry on a "clean" stream could thus discharge 
noxious effluents in greater quantities than could a similar industry 
on a stream that is already polluted. The net effect of having water 
quality standards without effluent and degradation standards, then, 
would be to encourage industries to locate on "clean" streams rather 
than to improve existing facilities on polluted streams. 
Secretary Udall responded to these problems in his formulation 
of Guidelines for Establishing Water Quality Standards for Inter-
state Waters.114 The first guideline prohibits standards which allow 
111. 33 U.S.C. § 466g(d)(l) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968) indicates that the Secretary is to 
initiate proceedings on the basis of "reports, surveys, or studies,'' but it does not set 
up a continuing mechanism for providing them. 
112. See generally Brown &: Duncan, Legal Aspects of a Federal Water Quality 
Surveillance System, 68 MICH. L. REv. 1131 (1970). 
113. See N.Y. Times, May 14, 1967, § 6 (Magazine), at 24. 
114. Federal Water Pollution Control Administration, U.S. Dept. of the Interior, 
Guidelines for Establishing Water Quality Standards for Interstate Waters, in Hear-
ings on Activities of the Federal Water Pollution Control Administration-Water' 
Quality Standards Before Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the Comm. on 
Public Works, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 2, at 659 (1967). 
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for degradation,115 and the third116 and the eighth117 guidelines im-
pose effluent standards. Nevertheless, the establishment of degrada-
tion and effluent standards presents problems, for neither type is 
expressly provided for in the Act. Furthermore, prohibiting the 
degradation of any interstate stream may substantially inhibit future 
industrial and municipal development;118 and uniform application 
of effluent standards on even a statewide basis may be unnecessary in 
many cases, since some bodies of water, because of their present 
quality, volume, flow, or other factors, have a greater ability to 
cleanse themselves than do others. Thus the standards that are ap-
plied to effluents discharged into these water systems need not be as 
rigid as those applied to effluents discharged into other systems. Ac-
cordingly, it would seem desirable that degradation and effluent 
standards be specifically authorized by statute119 and that those stan-
dards be subjected to frequent administrative review in order to 
keep them responsive to changing state needs. 
The problems with the Act's enforcement provisions themselves, 
however, are perhaps not the most serious ones encountered in at-
tempting to enforce the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. No 
piece of legislation is self-executing; and, consequently, the burden 
l 15. Guideline l (emphasis added) provides: 
Water quality standards should be designed to enhance the quality of water. 
If it is impossible to provide for prompt improvement in water quality at the 
time initial standards are set, the standards should be designed to prevent any 
increase in pollution. In no case will standards providing for less than existing 
water quality be acceptable. 
116. Guideline ll provides: 
Water quality criteria should be applied to the stream or other receiving water 
or portions thereof. The criteria should identify the water uses to be protected 
and establish limits on pollutants or effects of pollution necessary to provide for 
such uses. Numerical values should be stated for such quality characteristics 
where such values are available and applicable. Where appropriate, biological 
bioassay parameters may be used. In the absence of appropriate numerical values 
of biological parameters, criteria should consist of verbal descriptions in sufficient 
detail as to show clearly the quality of water intended (e.g., "substantially free 
from oil'1· 
117. Guideline 8 provides: 
No standard will be approved which allows any wastes amenable to treatment or 
control to be discharged into any interstate water without treatment or control 
regardless of the water quality criteria and water use or uses adopted. Further, 
no standard will be approved which does not require all wastes, prior to dis-
charge into any interstate water, to receive the best practicable treatment or con-
trol unless it can be demonstrated that a lesser degree of treatment or control will 
provide for water quality enhancement commensurate with proposed present and 
future water uses. 
IIB. The State of Iowa has recently claimed that the Secretary of Interior has ex-
ceeded his authority under the Act by insisting on standards which both prohibit 
degradation of existing water quality and prescribe effluent standards. See AIR &: 
WATER NEWs, Nov. 4, 1969, at 9-10. The objections made by Iowa reaffirm similar ob-
jections made by the Governor of Wyoming in March 1968. See 114 CoNG. REc. 
H 2984 (daily ed. April 24, 1968). 
II9. See 114 CoNG. REc. H 2968 (daily ed. April 24, 1968). 
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of actual enforcement lies not only in the substantive provisions of 
an act, but also in the hands of the various governmental units desig-
nated to carry out those provisions. The importance of this problem 
may be seen in the fact that executive and legislative branches of 
government apparently have not been as zealous as they might have 
been in appropriating funds for projects authorized by the Act. For 
example, the 1956 Act authorized the grant of federal subsidies for 
sewage treatment works,120 and the 1966 Act authorized the appro-
priation of 1.25 billion dollars in construction grants for those proj-
ects in the fiscal year 1970.121 The President's budget request, how-
ever, was for only 214 million dollars.122 Congress finally agreed 
upon an appropriation of 800 million dollars amid predictions that 
the Administration would not spend the entire amount appropri-
ated.12s 
Moreover, the problems caused by the failure to appropriate 
adequate sums for pollution control are intensified by what has ap-
parently been inefficient utilization of the funds which have been 
made available. On November 3, 1969, for instance, the Comptroller 
General of the United States forwarded to Congress a report entitled 
Examination into the Effectiveness of the Construction Grant Pro-
gram for Abating, Controlling, and Preventing Water Pollution.124 
The Report's principal finding is as follows: 
During fiscal years 1957 through 1969, FWPCA awarded grants to 
States, municipalities, and intergovernmental agencies of about $1.2 
billion for the construction of more than 9,400 projects having a 
total estimated cost of about $5.4 billion. 
These projects have contributed to abating water pollution be-
cause the problem would have been worse if the projects had not 
been constructed. GAO [the General Accounting Office, headed by 
the Comptroller General] believes, however, that the benefits have 
not been as great as they could have been because many waste treat-
ment facilities have been constructed on waterways where major 
polluters-industrial or municipal-located nearby continued to dis-
charge untreated or inadequately treated wastes into the water-
ways.125 
Such haphazard application of pollution control measures will not 
120. 1956 Act § 6(a), as amended, 33 U.S.C. § 466(a) (1964). 
121. 1966 Act § 205 [amending FWPCA § S(d)], as amended, 33 U.S.C. § 466e(d) 
(Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
122. Wicker, In the Nation: The Pollution of Promises, N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1970, 
§ 4, at 15, col. 5. 
123. Id. 
124. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, EXAMINATION INTO THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CON· 
STRUCTION GRANT PROGRAM FOR .ABATING, CONTROLLING, AND PREVENTING '\TATER POLLU· 
TION, No. B-166506 (Nov. 3, 1969). 
125. Id. at 1. 
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provide any enduring long-run solution to the problem of water pol-
lution. 
III. THE 1969 AND 1970 Acrs: SoME TIMID STEPS 
TOWARD A SOLUTION 
Public reaction to pollution has been slow in developing into 
an effective political force. The publication of Rachel Carson's The 
Silent Spring126 in 1962 brought the problem of environmental pol-
lution before the public and touched off a controversy which now 
seems to have been settled in her favor. The grounding of the Tor-
rey Canyon on Seven Stones Reef off southwestern England in 
March 1967 slowly came to be recognized as a great disaster.127 
Finally, the Union Oil Company "blowout" in January 1969 demon-
strated to most Americans the possible magnitude of pollution prob-
lems.128 Thus, environmental problems which had been neglected 
for so long were suddenly placed with stark force before the public 
eye. As a result, Congress has become much more willing to take a 
strong stand on the issue of pollution control. 
The first congressional response to the rising tide of public opin-
ion was the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,129 signed by 
President Nixon on January I, 1970. Title I of the Act reaffirms 
"that it is the continuing policy of the Federal Government, in co-
operation with State and local governments, and other concerned 
public and private organizations, to use all practicable means and 
measures, including financial and technical assistance, in a manner 
calculated to foster and promote the general welfare, [and] to create 
and maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist in 
productive harmony .... "130 It also requires all federal agencies to 
submit to the President, to the newly created Council on Environ-
mental Quality,131 and to the public, a report detailing the environ-
mental impact of any proposed legislation or of other proposed 
major federal action. That report must describe any unavoidable en-
vironmental effects of the proposal, possible alternatives to the pro-
posed action, and any irreversible commitment of resources which 
126. R. CARSON, THE SILENT SPRING (1962). 
127. See Hearings on S. 7 and S. 44 Before the Subcomm. on Air and Water Pol-
lution of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 257 (1969). 
128. See Hearings on S. 1219 Before the Subcomm. on Minerals, Materials, and 
Fuels of the Senate Comm. on interior and Insular Affairs, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 31 
(1969). 
129. Act of Jan. I, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-190; 83 Stat. 852 (hereinafter 1969 Act]. 
130. 1969 Act § !Ola. 
131. See text accompanying note 133 infra. 
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the proposal would require.132 The Act thus calls for a new aware-
ness of the environmental problems that are involved in all govern-
mental actions. Undoubtedly, a conscious awareness of the existence 
of a problem is an important first step in the quest for an effective 
remedy. 
Title II of the Act creates, in the Executive Office of the Presi-
dent, the Council on Environmental Quality.133 The Council is 
designed to be an independent fact-finding body to advise the Presi-
dent on the environment. In addition, according to the Act, the 
Council is to make a comprehensive study of trends and problems in 
environmental quality-including those in the area of water pollu-
tion-and to develop a series of priorities for dealing with those 
problems.134 The Act also directs the Council "to review and ap-
praise the various programs and activities of the Federal Govern-
ment in the light of the policy set forth in Title I of this Act."135 
The creation of the Council on Environmental Quality seems to 
take a major step in solving one of the acute problems under the 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act. At last Congress has recog-
nized that environmental problems, including those of water pollu-
tion, must be approached in a systematic and comprehensive manner. 
It is to be hoped that the new Council will develop concrete pro-
posals for an efficient division of authority in environmental control, 
and that the Council's findings will provide a basis upon which to 
amend present laws, primarily the Federal Water Pollution Control 
Act, in order to mobilize local, state, and federal resources to fight 
pollution in the most rational manner. 
Shortly after the passage of the National Environmental Policy 
Act, Congress unanimously passed the Water Quality Improvement 
Act of 1970.136 That Act, which became law on April 3, 1970, sub-
stantially amends the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. The 
1970 amendments are important not only for their substantive pro-
visions, but also for the apparent modification in congressional 
policy which they reflect. The new section 11 added by the amend-
ments, 137 dealing with the problem of water pollution caused by oil 
spillage, replaces the Oil Pollution Act of 1924138 and brings within 
132. 1969 Act § 102. 
133. 1969 Act § 202. 
134. 1969 Act § 202; H.R. REP. No. 378, 91 Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), reprinted in 
1969 U.S. CODE CONG. &: AD. NEWS 3149, 3158. 
135. 1969 Act § 204(3). 
136. Act of April 3, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-224, 84 Stat. 91 [hereinafter 1970 
Act]. 
137. 1970 Act § 102. 
138. The 1924 Act, as amended, 33 U.S.C. §§ 431-37 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968), is re• 
pealed by § 108 of the 1970 Act. 
May 1970] Enforcement Provisions 1127 
the scope of the more general Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
the specific problem of oil spillage. This section provides that per-
sons in charge of any vessel or of any onshore or offshore oil facility 
shall be subject to a fine of up to 10,000 dollars or imprisonment for 
one year or both for failure to report any known discharge of oil 
into navigable waters or onto the adjoining shoreline.139 In addition, 
the owner or operator of any vessel or facility from which oil is 
knowingly discharged is subject to a civil penalty of 10,000 dollars 
for each offense.140 Thus, for the first time, Congress has determined 
to impose civil and criminal penalties under the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act for past acts of pollution. The existence of 
such penalties should provide the shipping and oil industries with 
economic incentives to exercise a strong degree of self-regulation 
with regard to oil pollution.141 
Section 11 also provides for the preparation of a National Con-
tingency Plan for the effective detection and removal of oil spills.142 
If and when an oil spill does occur, the owner of the polluting facil-
ity is given the opportunity to remove the oil. If he fails to do so, 
the President may arrange for the removal of the oil pursuant to the 
National Contingency Plan.143 If the President does act to remove 
the oil, the owner of the vessel or the facility from which the oil is 
discharged is then liable to the United States for the costs of re-
moving the oil, subject to certain monetary limitations based on the 
degree of fault and the type of facility causing the spillage.144 If the 
owner can prove the responsibility of a third party, he may escape 
liability, and the third party will be liable;145 if he can prove that 
the discharge was caused solely by an act of God, an act of war, or 
a negligent act by the United States, the federal government will 
have to bear the cost of removal.146 By holding responsible for the 
costs of removal those who cause oil pollution, the new amendment 
provides a further economic deterrent to the potential polluter. 
Section 12 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, added 
by the 1970 amendments, deals with the control of hazardous pol-
lll9. 1970 Act § 102 (adding § ll(b)(4) to the FWPCA). 
140. 1970 Act § 102 (adding § ll(b)(5) to the FWPCA). 
141. The penalties are more stringent than those that were provided by the Oil 
Pollution Act of 1924, llll U.S.C. § 4ll4 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
142. 1970 Act § 102 (adding § ll(c)(2) to the FWPCA). 
14ll. 1970 Act § 102 (adding § ll(e) to the FWPCA). Section ll(k) of the FWPCA 
sets up a $35,000,000 revolving fund for the Government to use in removing oil spill• 
age. 
144. 1970 Act § 102 (adding §§ ll(f)(l)-(3) to the FWPCA). 
145. 1970 Act § 102 (adding § ll(g) to the FWPCA). 
146. 1970 Act § 102 (adding § ll(f)(l) to the FWPCA). 
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luting substances other than oil.147 Basically, section 12 contemplates 
that the President shall designate distinct elements or compounds 
which, like oil, constitute definable water pollution hazards.148 Such 
substances will, again like oil, be subject to removal if spilled into 
navigable waters or onto shorelines.149 The President is further di-
rected to recommend measures and limits for assessing against the 
polluter the costs of such removal, presumably so that provisions 
similar to those found in section I I will be extended to other haz-
ardous substances.150 
The 1970 Act's other two substantive amendments relevant to the 
enforcement of water quality standards151 are sections 13 and 21. 
Section 13 requires the Secretary of the Interior, in conjunction with 
the Secretary of Transportation,152 to "promulgate federal standards 
of performance for marine sanitation devices . . . which shall be 
designed to prevent the discharge of untreated or inadequately 
treated sewage into or upon the navigable waters of the United 
States from new vessels and existing vessels .... "153 Violations of 
the federal standards by any manufacturer or vessel owner subjects 
the violator to an injunction in a federal district court and a civil 
penalty for each violation.154 Section 2 I establishes a procedure to be 
followed by an applicant "for a Federal license or permit to conduct 
any activity including, but not limited to, the construction or op-
eration of facilities which may result in any discharge into the navi-
gable waters of the United States .... "155 Under that procedure, 
before a federal license may be issued to an applicant, his application 
must be submitted for certification by the appropriate state or inter-
state agency in the area in which the discharge will occur.106 Such 
certification is to be made only if the agency is satisfied at a public 
hearing that the facility's discharges will not violate applicable water 
quality standards.167 If, after the hearing, the agency refuses to grant 
147. 1970 Act § 102 (adding § 12(a) to the FWPCA). 
148. 1970 Act § 102 (adding § 12(a) to the FWPCA). 
149. 1970 Act § 102 (adding § 12(d) to the FWPCA). 
150. 1970 Act § 102 (adding § 12(g) to the FWPCA). 
151. Like all prior Acts, the 1970 Act contains provisions not directly related to 
enforcement of water quality standards. Thus, FWPCA §§ 16-18 provide for training 
grants and scholarships for the training of pollution control experts and the like. 
152. Section 13 designates this Secretary as "the Secretary of the department in 
which the Coast Guard is operating." In peacetime that is the Secretary of Transpor-
tation, in wartime, the Secretary of the Navy. 49 C.F.R. § I.4 (1970). 
153. 1970 Act § 102 (adding § 13(b)(l) to the FWPCA). 
154. 1970 Act § 102 (adding §§ 13(h)-G) to the FWPCA). 
155. 1970 Act § 103 (adding § 2l(b)(l) to the FWPCA). 
156. 1970 Act § 103 (adding § 2l(b)(l) to the FWPCA). 
157. 1970 Act § 103 (adding § 2l(b)(l) to the FWPCA). 
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certification, no federal license can be issued;158 but if the agency 
fails to act on an application within one year after submission, the 
certification requirement is waived.159 
The Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970 does provide a posi-
tive response to many of the problems existing under the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act. By repealing the Oil Pollution Act of 
1924160 and placing an oil pollution control mechanism under the 
more general water pollution control statute, Congress seems to be 
taking a determined step to integrate at the federal level the fight 
against water pollution from whatever source. Sections 12 and 13 of 
the new Act reflect the same tendency. Certainly Congress has not 
gone far enough in devising a comprehensive scheme to combat 
water pollution, but the 1970 amendments do seem to reflect a move-
ment in that direction. The enforcement provisions now have con-
siderable force, at least with regard to the control of oil pollution, 
and it is to be hoped that section 12 will provide an effective vehicle 
for developing readily available and effective remedies, in the form 
of civil and criminal penalties, with respect to other definite classes 
of pollutants as well. 
In addition to creating a more comprehensive federal statute, 
the 1970 amendments have taken a positive step toward better de-
fining various realms of influence in water pollution control. Section 
13, which provides for the control of sewage from vessels, pre-empts 
any state action in the field.161 This course of action is undoubtedly 
wise, since differing state standards could greatly impede interstate 
commerce by waterway. On the other hand, section I I, dealing with 
oil pollution control, does not pre-empt state law on the subject.162 
This policy of selective pre-emption according to the demands of the 
given pollution problem should be carried into other areas of pollu-
tion control as well, in order to effect a better allocation of responsi-
bility between the federal government and state or local units. 
Section 21 is significant in this respect, for it allows the states, 
through the certification procedure, to exercise an effective veto over 
federally licensed projects whenever the pollution threat posed by 
the project is sufficiently great. Thus, section 21 correctly recognizes 
that it would be unwise for the federal government to establish uni-
form standards for federally licensed projects, when local water con-
ditions vary so widely throughout the country. 
158. 1970 Act § 103 (adding § 2l(b)(l) to the FWPCA). 
159. 1970 Act § 103 (adding § 2l(b)(l) to the FWPCA). 
160. See note 138 supra. 
161. 1970 Act § 102 (adding § 13(£) to the FWPCA). 
162. 1970 Act § 102 (adding § ll(o)(2) to the FWPCA). 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The evolution of the enforcement provisions of the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act has been a slow and painful process. 
Each amendment to the Act has perpetuated as many problems as it 
has solved, either by ignoring existing problems or by using half. 
measures to attempt to solve them. While such a course of develop-
ment is to be expected in an area such as environmental law, which 
has not traditionally been considered by Congress to be of para-
mount importance, it is no longer an acceptable course of develop-
ment when that area becomes one of vital importance. Although the 
American public has gradually come to realize during the decade of 
the 1960's that pollution in general, and water pollution in particu-
lar, is a national problem of the highest priority, Congress has not 
responded with the bold measures which are necessary if there is to 
be effective pollution control. Although the battle against pollution 
must be fought simultaneously on many different fronts,163 the en-
forcement provisions of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
can provide important weapons in the fight. Thus the Act can and 
must be made more effective in carrying out its role in the over-all 
scheme of pollution control. But half-measures will not suffice; 
rather, well-reasoned and well-developed changes must be made to 
transform the Act into a comprehensive package, able to respond 
with a full panoply of remedies to varying degrees of pollution from 
whatever source. 
Perhaps the 1969 and 1970 Acts are a harbinger of such reform. 
The temporal proximity between the two Acts may indicate a genu-
ine kindling of congressional interest in halting water pollution. 
The substance of those Acts also offers hope for the future, for the 
National Environmental Policy Act emphasizes the need for plan-
ning and coordination in pollution control, and, more important, 
the Water Quality Improvement Act begins to integrate specific water 
pollution control measures into the general Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act. Thus both of the new Acts seem to constitute the genesis 
of a more rational approach to pollution problems. Let those of us 
who value clean water pray that subsequent legislation will continue 
in this direction with even more conviction. 
163. It is, of course, not suggested that the enforcement provisions of the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act constitute the single answer to the problem of water 
pollution. Rather they are only a remedial device. Other measures, such as public 
and private subsidies to develop antipollution devices, tax incentives to induce pollu-
tion control, and educating the public on pollution control, are surely important in 
the fight against pollution, but they are outside the scope of this Article. 
